This study analyzes the fees of mutual funds and the choices of mutual fund investors. Using a comprehensive dataset on males in two Finnish provinces, we find that the fees of funds selected by high IQ investors are not significantly lower than the fees of funds selected by low IQ investors. This conclusion controls for a variety of fund and individual attributes that explain mutual fund fees and mutual fund choices. This suggests that fees are set competitively in the fund industry.
I. Introduction
If economic thought rests on a solid foundation, one expects to observe competitive pricing in a frictionless market with rational consumers. One implication of this is the law of one price-that is, identical goods or services sell for the same amount.
If prices for the same good differ in the same market, economic reasoning implies that either the goods differ in ways that are apparent to the consumer but not to the empirical economist, or the market is not competitive. Lack of competition has to be due to some underlying friction on either the supply side (e.g., barriers to entry) or demand side (e.g., information frictions). This paper, using data from Finland, offers an empirical analysis of the competitiveness of the market for mutual fund services by studying how demand is influenced by an investor's intellectual ability (which we sometimes refer to as "IQ" or "ability"). We assume that this market has no supply side frictions 1 and study whether demand side frictions account for differences in fees. Suppose, for example, that there are no differences in the value of services provided by funds with different fees. 2 In this case, investors of high intellectual ability, who face lower information frictions, would be more likely to avoid high fee funds. On the other hand, even in the absence of information frictions, differences in fees could exist in a competitive market if funds offered services of different value. If these service differences were valued equally, we would not expect IQ to be correlated with fees. On the other hand, if the services are of more value to low IQ than to high IQ investors, a negative correlation between fee and IQ could exist and still be consistent with a competitive market for mutual fund services.
The most salient observation from our data is that, within fund categories, the fund fees paid by investors of high intellectual ability are not significantly below those paid by investors of low intellectual ability. This suggests that differences in the fees of funds probably do not arise from frictions generated by the inability to process fee information. It is at least plausible that the observed fee differences arise because of differences in services across funds and that both high and low IQ investors value those service differences equally.
Evidence supporting this interpretation also is found from comparisons across fund categories. Balanced funds tend to have higher fees than portfolios of bond and equity funds that generate similar asset allocations. Fees are especially high for balanced funds marketed through a retail network, generally run by the investor's bank. In the absence of ability to time the market, the asset allocation service of balanced funds appears to be of little value to high IQ investors. After all, for someone of reasonable intelligence, buying both a bond fund and an equity fund is not "rocket science." If this assertion is true, we would expect to see many high IQ investors avoid the high fees of balanced funds by creating their own "home-made" balanced funds. By contrast, low IQ investors may not understand the concept of asset allocation and prefer to pay someone to educate them about it and take care of it in one simple fund. There is a cost to provide this service, as well as a cost for marketing the need for such a service to low IQ investors. Thus, in a competitive market, balanced funds that bear these costs could assess a higher fee than a nearly identical portfolio of equity and bond funds.
Our data show that higher IQ investors avoid balanced funds marketed through the retail networks, which tend to have far higher fees. This is not to say that all high IQ investors place no value on "one-stop shopping" for their asset allocation. At some price point, which may differ across investors, one prefers the convenience of a balanced fund to a portfolio of equity and bond funds. Such balanced funds would be less likely to handhold the prospective investor, to be marketed in a less costly manner, and to have lower fees than the retail network balanced funds. Such non-retail balanced funds have grown in number over time and have begun to earn some of the business of the higher IQ investors. Indeed, our results show that IQ is unrelated to an investor's likelihood of holding a non-retail balanced fund, which typically has far lower fees than a retail balanced fund.
In spite of this evidence, it is possible to argue that the high-fee retail balanced funds are unique at exploiting low IQ investors. This would be the case if the marginal cost of providing the balanced fund service to low IQ investors was below the price charged for those services. We are skeptical about this argument because of our other finding that within all classes of funds, fund fees paid by low IQ investors are not significantly larger than those for high IQ investors.
Taken together, our results imply that one must be cautious before jumping to the conclusion that differences in fees across mutual funds imply that investors are being gouged by the higher fee funds. The diversity of fees may reflect quality differences across funds that escape the naïve observer, but not the perceptive eye of the marginal consumer of fund services. Fee diversity also may reflect the differing values that different clienteles place on those services.
A difference in stock picking ability across fund managers does not appear to be one of the service differences that account for differences in fees. Fama-MacBeth regressions, over a longer sample period, cannot establish whether or not there is statistically reliable relationship between fees and performance (measured before fees are deducted).
To our best knowledge, this is the first study to address the issue of industry competitiveness by analyzing the role of intellectual ability in consumer behavior. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the institutional setting, the data, and the empirical methodology. Section 3 presents summary statistics and regression results. Section 4 concludes the paper by interpreting the regression results.
Institutional Setting, Data, and Methodology

The Finnish Mutual Fund Market
Mutual funds registered in Finland differ from U.S. funds in several respects.
First, the fees are more transparent. Funds cannot debit marketing, custodial, or other expenses of similar nature from fund asset values; the only legitimate deductible costs are management fees and transaction costs. Thus, management advisory fees are all-inclusive and are equivalent to expense ratios in the U.S.
Front-end loads, when they exist, tend to be lower than in the U.S., usually 1%.
Funds are generally bought directly from the intermediary representing the fund company, most commonly the local bank branch selling fund products of that bank. 4 The small front-end loads offer little incentive for outsiders to sell the funds and also make it more difficult for foreign fund families (e.g. Fidelity) to tap market share in Finland.
Brokers are not used to buy funds. However, some investors buy funds through a voluntary pension insurance scheme or at the recommendation of "independent" advisers (who tend to provide their services for free to the customer). As a rule, an investor using these alternative avenues ends up paying the same fees had she invested directly through a branch office.
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One consequence of this is that fund distribution is concentrated among large banks with extensive retail distribution networks, with the three largest banks accounting for a combined market share of about 70%. There also are many smaller asset management houses or other players in the market, such as one major Swedish bank, Handelsbanken, (but it has no retail distribution network to speak of The scores on the ability test are standardized to follow the stanine distribution (integers 1-9, approximating the normal distribution with each stanine representing one half of a standard deviation). Only those individuals with reliable ability scores are included in the sample.
The Finnish Armed Forces (FAF) test measures intellectual ability in three areas: mathematical ability, verbal ability, and logical reasoning. The FAF forms a composite ability score from the results in these three areas. We use the composite ability score in our analysis.
The FAF ability score significantly predicts life outcomes, such as income, wealth, and marital status. Figure 1 shows that for male cohorts above 30 years of age, the correlation between ability and ordinary income generally ranges from 0.25 to 0.3. Figure 2 shows that for virtually all cohorts above 25 years of age, married males have higher ability scores than single or cohabiting men.
In Figure 1 , the low or negative correlations for the youngest cohorts are driven by the fact that smart students are likely to study longer and start earning higher incomes only later. In Figure 2 , the higher ability scores for the oldest cohorts (born before 1961 or so) are driven by the fact that these individuals probably postponed entry to military service due to their studies (the earliest data is from 1982). The reverse applies to the very youngest generations: conditional on having taken the test by 2001, i.e. the last military data year, they are less likely to have become students and postponed their entry to the military service.
Methodology
Our approach to analyzing fees largely consists of regressions with the dependent variable being the fee of a fund associated with a fund-investor pairing. There are controls for investor income, wealth (value of individual stocks plus mutual fund wealth), and a host of dummy variables that control for fund type and distribution network type.
Because residuals of the same fund tend to be correlated across investors in that fund, we estimate the regression using robust clustering assumptions on the residual covariance matrix. This estimation approach allows for general heteroskedasticity, along with offdiagonal elements that are block-diagonal for each fund.
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Much of the empirical analyses use dependent variables consisting of fees, frontend loads, and back-end loads at the beginning of a month in which an investor sells shares in a mutual fund. An observation is a pairing of an investor with a fund. For an investor who sells the same fund in multiple months during the sample period, we use the investor's trade-weighted fees and loads as the investor's fee in that fund, with fees and loads reported at the beginning of the months of sale. (For most funds, this averaging process is irrelevant as fees and loads rarely change and using the fee and load schedule reported at the beginning of the sample period hardly makes a difference.) We employ this approach because we lack direct data on the funds that investors own or that investors purchase.
Most investors are associated with only one fund. Because of this, our sample size, based on each investor-fund pairing, is only slightly larger than the number of investors in the two provinces who sold funds over our sample period. All of our analyses exclude investors who never sold a fund during our sample period. In addition to the regressions described above, we also employ logit regressions to study the binary choice of a balanced fund. Here, we have the same investor-fund pair as the unit of observation, but the dependent variable is the logit of the decision. Finally, to study performance, we use the familiar Fama-MacBeth technique with returns on the left hand side and both fees and fund category dummy variables on the right hand side of monthly cross-sectional regressions. Panel A also lists summary statistics by year. Over the sample period, there was entry into the balanced fund arena with the entering funds having lower fees than their more seasoned counterparts. The older balanced funds with higher fees tend to be distributed through retail networks, but the newer balanced funds are not distributed this way. The investor-weighted fee for balanced funds did not decline as a consequence of fund entry because the number of investors in the retail balanced funds with higher fees grew over time as well.
Results
Summary data
Panel B of Table 1 indicates that balanced funds are more widely held than the other categories of funds. They also tend to have the smallest holdings, in part because they tend to have the smallest minimum investment. investors with the highest IQ invest in funds with the lowest fees and loads. The differences between the fees and loads of the highest and lowest IQ investors are statistically significant in all three panels. However, when we group fees by the type of fund, the significance of these differences largely disappears (except for the loads on bond funds, at a significance level that does not survive the Bonferroni inequality for the multiple comparison). Thus, differences in the fees and loads paid by high and low IQ investors are accounted for by the type of fund they invest in, rather than a search within a fund type for low fee funds. They charge 38 basis points per year more than the non-network balanced funds and far more still than bond funds. Thus, while high IQ investors may be willing to pay substantially more for the asset allocation mix of a professional manager in lieu of a home-made mix of pure bond and equity funds, they are reluctant to incur the fees charged by the retail balanced funds. Low IQ investors are either unaware of how to invest in the cheaper balanced fund alternatives or appreciate the convenience of obtaining a retail network balanced fund from their local bank.
Ability Predicts Avoidance of Balanced Funds
The coefficient on the ability score for retail funds is of the same order of magnitude as the coefficients for logged wealth and income. The effect of a stanine change in IQ on avoidance of high fee retail funds is similar to that of a two to threefold increase in wealth and income. The coefficients on ability in Panel A not only indicate a lack of statistical significance, there also seems to be a lack of economic significance. All but the balanced fund regressions have ability coefficients on the order of ½ basis point or less per IQ stanine. In most cases the effect is far less. In the case of loads, these are one-time fees.
Ability Does Not Predict Avoidance of High Fee Funds When Controls Are Used
Also, back end loads sometimes are early redemption fees, intended to discourage investors from taking advantage a fund's mark to market imperfections at redemption time.
The impact of the ability coefficients for the balanced funds, while insignificant, is complicated by the large difference in fees between retail and non-retail balanced funds. If high IQ investors avoid such funds-the behavior observed in Table 3 -one might observe a negative coefficient. For the lack of competition argument to work, it must be that the cost Nordea or similar retailers incur to provide services to this sub-clientele of smart investors must be less than the revenue obtained from the higher fee. Although the resulting economic profits are attractive to entrants, these smart investors must be more indifferent to entry by competitors than dumb investors. Finally, for some reason, the economic forces at work allow these smart investors to be charged exorbitant fees only for retail funds in the balanced fund arena. Is this credible? We are more inclined to believe that investors, certainly the smarter investors, are probably getting something for the extra fees they pay.
What they are getting is not obvious to us, but it may be obvious to them.
It also is possible that this sign reflects the limitations of inferences about ownership from the sales data we have. A positive coefficient here can arise from smart investors selling the higher fee retail balanced funds and exiting for the lower fee nonretail balanced funds that became more prominent over the sample period. While sales reflect prior ownership, the relative lack of sales among lower IQ investors can also reflect inertia rather than lack of ownership.
The Relation of Performance before Fees to Fees
Berk and Green's (2004) model of equilibrium fees in the portfolio management industry suggests that differences in the fees of active fund managers might reflect differences in ability. For this reason, we investigate the relation between fees and performance. Table 5 reports coefficients from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of monthly fund returns (before deducting fees) on fund type dummies and fees. The relation of performance to fee is reported as the average of the coefficients on fees from the monthly cross-sectional regressions. Berk and Green's hypothesis is that this coefficient should be one, while those who believe that active fund management adds no value hypothesize an average coefficient of zero.
The t-statistics reported in Table 5 indicate how significant the coefficient is from zero. The standard errors, obtained by dividing the fee coefficient by the t-statistics, are generally too large to draw conclusions about whether performance is a service difference that might account for differences in fees. The average coefficient is both insignificantly different from zero and insignificantly different from one.
For the twelve year period, the standard error for the fee is virtually identical to the coefficient, which is slightly above one. While the point estimate of the coefficient for the 12-year period is close to one, an investor looking at the period just prior to the 1998-2000 sample period to draw inferences about how fees influence performance would have estimated a 0.598 sensitivity of performance to fees. This point estimate is too small to justify buying a high fee fund in the absence of other services provided in conjunction with those fees.
Summary and Conclusion
If demand side frictions generate a noncompetitive outcome, we expect some investors to flee that outcome. These are not going to be the investors facing the greatest information barriers about how to flee. Rather, they are likely to be the most intelligent investors, whose cognitive abilities allow them to make price comparisons and deduce how to avoid excessive prices.
With respect to mutual funds, we have found that high fee funds are avoided when it is clear that the service provided is not of use to the investor. In the case of balanced funds sold through a retail distribution network, fees exceed the weighted average fee of a synthetic balanced fund created from investments in both an equity fund and a bond fund. The asset allocation service may justify a higher fee, but more so for investors who cannot, without great effort or cost on their part, replicate that service. It is quite clear that a high IQ investor does not benefit from the asset allocation service to the same extent as a low IQ investor. It may be difficult for the latter investor to understand how to construct an asset allocation strategy from pure equity and bond funds. Thus, it is not surprising that high IQ investors avoid balanced funds that charge extremely high rates for the asset allocation service, as is typical of balanced funds distributed by retail networks.
On the other hand, when balanced funds charge a bit less for the service of providing both bonds and stocks, as is typical of the newer balanced funds that are not purchased from a retail distribution network, high IQ investors buy them. Low IQ investors either do not know how to obtain access to these funds as alternatives to those distributed by their banks or lack the minimum investment amounts that these funds require.
When the service provided is equally valued by high and low IQ investors, we do not expect a relationship between IQ and fees in a competitive market. Within fund types, there are differences in fees and differences in services. However, because the service is a bit more opaque to the researcher, but not the customer, one cannot say for certain that the lack of a relationship between IQ and fees within fund types, which we document, proves a competitive outcome. It is possible that the service difference, in whole or in part, is the expectation of performance, but the standard errors associated with this analysis are too large to know this with any degree of confidence.
What we do know is that high IQ investors are sensitive to fees charged for transparent benefits that are easy to replicate more cheaply. It strikes us as unlikely that they would be blind to fees when the fees charged differ within the fund sector for no Our analysis would be difficult to extend to other industries. Because the primary attribute of the product sold by funds, an expected risk return trade-off, is far less complex than the attributes of other goods and services, it is easier for us to argue that service differences in the mutual fund industry are not themselves associated with monopoly-like rents. This argument is more difficult to make in other industries. For example, medical services may vary along many dimensions-skill of the doctor at diagnosing and treating many different disease categories, hospital one can be admitted to, waiting time when seeking medical help, bedside manner, etc. Some of these are unique to the provider. Similarly, the utility obtained from a fashionable line of clothing or cosmetics may differ along dimensions that are unique to the provider. The inability of other producers to mimic each of these preference dimensions may contribute to demand functions for the producer's goods and services that are far from perfectly elastic.
The primary product of a mutual fund that is unable to "beat the market," is easily mimicked both by other funds and by other investment routes, such as holding individual securities. That primary product appears to be supplemented with services that do not appear to be so homogeneous as to preclude all differences in fees. However, outside of stock picking ability, which this paper can neither demonstrate nor rule out, it is difficult to imagine that the additional services funds provide generate monopoly-like rents.
Despite the seemingly competitive structure of the mutual fund market, a number of researchers have suggested that the market is not competitive. Bailey, Kumar, and Ng (2006) find that investors hold high expense ratio funds instead of index funds because of overconfidence. Barber and Odean (2005) and Korkeamaki and Smythe (2004) contend that investors are not terribly sensitive to less visible fees (although the former paper finds that visible fees, like loads, affect fund flows). This would seem to suggest that information frictions prevent the competitive outcome and that variation in fees cannot be explained by differences in the quality of the services that funds provide. On the other hand, Zhang (2007) and Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2007) seems to refute this evidence.
Others have argued that economies of scale in the production function for management advisory services are obvious and that such economies imply that the market is not competitive because fee schedules do not reflect these economies. However, in an equilibrium where the production function has this property, price can only equal marginal cost for an industry structure with only a few large funds that charge negligible fees for their services. The noncompetitive equilibrium has even fewer funds.
This conclusion is clearly at odds with the existing structure of the mutual fund industry.
Instead, there is a seemingly endless proliferation of funds, of all sizes, with a wide variety of fees.
All of this is of great interest to U.S. regulators because mutual funds are a unique form of organization. To escape corporate taxation under the Investment Companies Act of 1940, the management of the fund passes all corporate profits on to shareholders (the fund investors). In this case, however, the advisors of the fund set up the corporate structure, organize its management, and design its investment policy to appeal to a particular investor niche. These investors are customers on the one hand, but also shareholders that elect a board to approve the advisor and the advisor's compensation.
The additional protections afforded by having customers as shareholders, and binding advisors to them with a fiduciary duty to charge a fair fee, grew out of an era that saw great mistrust of markets and the protections they offer consumers. Some, viewing differences in fees today, may contend that these additional protections need to be strengthened, even if these protections generate additional costs. Our findings provide no evidence that would support this view. 
